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COMMENTS
INDIANS-STATE JURISDICTION OVER
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS ON TRIBAL LANDS
The recent appearance of large scale real estate developments on
leased Indian lands has attracted public attention to the intricate
maze of jurisdictional problems arising from the complex FederalState-Indian relationship. Spurred by the spector of a sprawling,
unregulated metropolis wreaking political and environmental havoc
from its sanctuary within protected Indian lands, States such as New
Mexico are attempting to assert their maximum powers to regulate
and tax such developments. Indian tribes, on the other hand, are
aware that the refuge from state taxation and control which reservation lands may provide is one of their most marketable features.
They are concerned for Tribal sovereignty and control over the use
of their reservations and are resisting the imposition of state authority. Conceding that both have valid interests, and realizing that the
developments themselves raise a plethora of social, political, and legal
issues far beyond the scope of a single article, it will be the purpose
of this paper to explore one such development and its attempted
resolution of state-Indian jurisdictional questions.
Seizing upon the economic opportunities afforded by the proposed construction of a flood-control dam and reservoir, California
Cities negotiated a 99-year lease with the Pueblo de Cochiti for the
purpose of developing a resort community with a potential population of 50,000. The lease was signed in 1969 and in 1970 a charter
for the Town of Cochiti Lake was approved by the Pueblo and
appended to the lease. In the interim, California Cities had encountered financial difficulties and had conveyed its interests in the
lease to Great Western Cities, Inc., the present developer. Late in
1970 the Attorney General of New Mexico filed suit against various
Department of Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs officials seeking
a declaration that they had acted without authority in approving the
creation and existence of the Town of Cochiti Lake. The suit maintained that their actions were void, and that the State had sole and
exclusive authority to create a municipality within its borders.' In
June 1971 the suit was dismissed with prejudice by the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico. The dismissal was
based on a stipulation between Great Western Cities, the Town of
1. New Mexico ex rel. Maloney v. Russell, Civil No. 8745 (D.N.M., dismissed June 4,

1971).
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Cochiti Lake, and the State of New Mexico. This stipulation purported to recognize the State's jurisdiction over all construction
undertaken under the lease, its civil and criminal jurisdiction over all
activities by Great Western and its non-Indian employees, and its
power to tax any interest held by Great Western in pueblo lands. The
Town of Cochiti Lake agreed not to exercise any criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians without State consent. Water consumption
was limited to rights purchased by the developers from sources other
than the Pueblo. Neither the Pueblo de Cochiti nor the Department
of Interior was a party to the stipulation.
The strength of this stipulation will be analyzed from two standpoints: whether under Federal and State law, particularly the New
Mexico Constitution, the State may legally assume such jurisdiction,
and, if it may, whether jurisdiction has been validly conferred by the
stipulation.

LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF STATE JURISDICTION
With respect to jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands the
states fall into two basic classes: those which have assumed civil and
criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280 or its successor, Title IV
of the Indian Civil Rights Act, and those which have not.2 New
Mexico has not, but even for states assuming such jurisdiction,
authorization to alienate, encumber, or tax Indian trust properties,
or to adjudicate ownership or right to possession of them has been
expressly withheld, indicating that these are areas of pre-eminent
Federal concern.'
As in the case of some of the other states, 4 there was a provision
in New Mexico's Enabling Act requiring a disclaimer of all proprietary rights to Indian lands located within its borders, the right or
title to which had been acquired through the United States or prior
sovereign.' This provision was subsequently incorporated in Article
XXI of the State Constitution which reads in part:
2. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (1964). Public Law 280 was substantially incorporated into Title IV of the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § § 1321-26 (1970), but the requirement of Indian consent was
added in order for a state to assume jurisdiction. Thus no states have obtained jurisdiction
under Title IV and the only states exercising jurisdiction are those which are included by
Public Law 280.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1970), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1964), 25 U.S.C. § § 1321(b), 1322(b)

(1970).
4. Arizona, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington.
See Ransom & Gilstrap, Indians-C'vil Jurisdiction in New Mexico-State, Federal, and
Tribal Courts, 1 N.M. L. Rev. 196 at 199 (1971).
5. Enabling Act for New Mexico, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557 (June 20, 1910).
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[A] nd that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have
been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States ... but all such lands shall be exempt

from taxation by this state so long and to such extent as the Congress of the United States has prescribed or may hereafter
6
prescribe.
Congressional permission has since been given to amend this disclaimer, but the State may not assume Title IV jurisdiction until the
amendment has been effected."
Conceding that New Mexico lacks whatever additional jurisdiction
Title IV confers, the question of the limits of its present power
remains. The Supreme Courts of both the United States and New
Mexico have agreed that disclaimers such as Article XXI affect only
proprietary rights and that states operating under them retain certain
governmental authority over Indian affairs.' That defining this
authority is an elusive task can be proven by examining two lines of
judicial precedent.
Both lines diverge from the case of Williams v. Lee in which Lee,
the owner of a general store on the Navajo Reservation, brought suit
to collect on a debt owed by Williams and his wife, Navajo Indians
living on the reservation. 9 Denying defendants' motion to dismiss,
the Arizona state courts entertained jurisdiction and entered judgment for Lee. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the exercise of state jurisdiction would impinge on tribal
sovereignty and that the case was therefore within the exclusive
domain of the Navajo Tribal Court. The Arizona Supreme Court
apparently acted on the theory that since no act of Congress expressly forbade their doing so, the State was free to assume jurisdiction." 0 Justice Black found this a "doubtful determination of the
important question of state power over Indian affairs," and proposed
as the proper test:
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question has
always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' 1
Justice Frankfurter apparently added a judicial twist to the Wil6. N.M. Const. art. XXI, § 2.
7. 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970). This provision is substantially the same as the Act of Aug.
15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 588.
8. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M.
196, 372 P.2d 387 (1962).
9. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
10. Williams v. Lee, 83 Aiz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
11. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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liams test in the case of Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, which
represents the first line of divergence from Williams. 12 In this case
the State of Alaska was attempting to regulate the use of fish traps
by the Thlinget Indians. Although the Thlingets have no reservation,
fishing rights are recognized as Indian property and protected by a
provision in the Alaska Statehood Act similar to Article XXI of the
New Mexico Constitution.' " In upholding the power of the State to
regulate the traps the court said, " 'absolute' federal jurisdiction is
not invariably exclusive jurisdiction." 1"4 Thus in reformulating the
test of state authority it concluded:
These decisions indicate that even on reservations state laws may be
applied to Indians unless such applications would interfere with
reservation self-government or impair a right granted or reserved by
federal law. 1 s (Emphasis added.)

If this is the correct test the state can apparently act unless expressly
forbidden to do so by Congress or unless interfering with tribal selfgovernment. This would indicate a reservoir of un-pre-empted
authority rather than the more limited arsenal of expressly conferred
powers.
The effect of the Kake decision on the New Mexico Supreme
Court was marked. Barely one year before its announcement the
court had written:
To our minds, the terms upon which New Mexico was admitted as

one of the States of the Union and Article XXI, Sec. 2 of our
Constitution, left no room for a claim by the state to governmental
power over the Indians or Indian lands, except where such jurisdiction has been specifically granted by Act of Congress, or6sanctioned
by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.1
Yet only weeks after Justice Frankfurter had delivered the Kake
opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court seized upon his distinction
between disclaiming proprietary and governmental interests.' 7 Seven
years later the New Mexico Court of Appeals used this residual
powers test to uphold the imposition of state income tax on the
earnings of a Zuni Indian working and living on the reservation.'
12. Organized Village of Kake, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
13. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508 § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (July 7, 1958).
14. Organized Village of Kake, 369 U.S. 60, 68 (1962).

15. Id.at 75.

16. Your Food Stores, Inc. v. Village of Espanola, 68 N.M. 327, 330, 361 P.2d 950, 953
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 915 (1961).
17. Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196, 205, 372 P.2d 387, 394 (1962).
18. Gahate v. Bureau of Revenue, 80 N.M. 98, 451 P.2d 1002 (Ct. App. 1969). Note that
the parties had stipulated that imposition of the tax would not affect Tribal selfgovernment.
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Nevertheless, upon closer scrutiny there are several aspects of
Kake which may impair its wholesale application to New Mexico.
First it must be noted that the Indian right asserted in Kake was
based on occupancy rather than on title, and no entry onto reserved
lands was involved. More important is the peculiar situation of
Alaska which was only emerging into statehood when the controversy arose. To be sure the Alaska Statehood Act and subsequently the Alaska Constitution contained disclaimers substantially
similar to Article XXI of the New Mexico Constitution. 1" Congress,
however, in 1958 had allowed the Territory of Alaska to assume civil
and criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280.20 Thus Alaska,
unlike New Mexico, had acceded to a broader jurisdiction over Indians and Indian affairs. In this light the decision of the Supreme
Court to uphold the application of a general statewide law to Indians
who were fishing off the reservation does not seem unreasonable.
Furthermore, as indicated before, the New Mexico disclaimer itself
precludes the assumption of Title IV jurisdiction. 2' This suggests
that the disclaimer now has a more restrictive effect on New Mexico's authority than it did on Alaska's and increases the disparity
2
between the states. 2
If, indeed, Alaska enjoys a unique situation in its apparent ability
to operate under a disclaimer but still assert its jurisdiction over
Indians, it would be enlightening to examine the other path of Williams as it has been applied in the Ninth Circuit to states more
closely approximating the situation in New Mexico.
In Littell v. Nakai the general counsel for the Navajo Tribe sought
an injunction in Federal District Court against Navajo Tribal Chairman Raymond Nakai, alleging that Nakai was interfering with the
performance of the counsel's duties. 2 3 The action was dismissed by
the Ninth Circuit on the ground that it was a matter for exclusive
tribal jurisdiction. Although Littell was authorized by the Depart19. Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508 § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (July 7, 1958); Alas.
Const. art. XII, § 12. Note that the Constitution altered the phrasing "absolute jurisdiction
and control" contained in the Statehood Act to "absolute disposition." See also Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 68-71 (1962).
20. By the Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545, the Territory of
Alaska was included among the Public Law 280 states.

21. See 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1970).
22. In its latest pronouncement on the question of assuming jurisdiction the United
States Supreme Court cited the need for "affirmative legislative action" by the state in order
to have assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280. Furthermore, legislative action by the
Tribal Council alone was insufficient to confer the consent necessary to assume jurisdiction
under Title IV. Thus unilateral action by the Tribal Council was insufficient to vest a
Montana State District Court with jurisdiction over a civil matter arising on the reservation.
See Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
23. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966).
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ment of Interior to act as general counsel, the basis of the action was
the contract and its interpretation, not the authority under which it
was established. In discussing tribal jurisdiction the court said:
The Navajo Tribe as such need not have a proprietary or other
legally recognized interest in the particular litigation or its outcome
in order for the controversy to be one concerning internal affairs ....

No doubt the Tribe in Williams, as in the case before us,

was neither an indispensable, a necessary, or even a proper party to
the action, but that was not the test. Rather, the test was a broader
the exercise
one hinging on whether the matter was one demanding
24
of the Tribe's responsibility for self government.

The second case, Hot Oil Service, Inc. v. Hall, dealt with a com-

plex situation involving a tribal lease on the Navajo Reservation. 2 s
The Tribe had leased to one of its members who conveyed her interest to a New Mexico corporation and then took a sublease. The
corporation attempted to bring an action for unpaid rent invoking
federal diversity jurisdiction, but the suit was dismissed on the
ground that if an Arizona State court would be without subjectmatter jurisdiction, there could be no federal diversity jurisdiction.
In speaking to the issue of state court subject-matter jurisdiction the
court determined:
The land involved was tribal Indian land which was leased by the
tribe to one of its members who, acting alone, conveyed a leasehold
interest to the non-Indian lessor. Involving Indian land, the suit
necessarily involved Reservation affairs. ... As we understand the
teaching of Williams, the Arizona State courts would have been with-

out subject-matter jurisdiction. 2 6 (Emphasis added.)
This concept of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over matters arising
from tribal leases was applied in a memorandum opinion by the
Federal District Court for Montana.2 7 There the court denied jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition sought by a land developer
holding a reservation lease to restrain the Blackfeet Tribal Court
from expelling him from the reservation. The court held:
The same rationale as that found in Littell and Williams would seem
equally applicable in the instant case and compels the conclusion
that the matters arising out of the lease are internal affairs of the
28
tribe and can be determined solely in the tribal court.
These precedents raise the issue of whether New Mexico, in agree24. Id. at 490.

25.
26.
27.
28.

366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 297.
United States v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244 F. Supp. 474 (D.Mont. 1965).
Id. at 478.
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ing to the stipulation and to the consequent assumption of jurisdiction and authority, acted ultra vires or unconstitutionally. In attempting to enforce building code regulations through the Construction Industries Commission and to assert civil and criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian employees of the lessee, the state must
inevitably encroach upon the interests and powers of the Indian
lessor. When such interests do collide it is difficult to foresee how the
matter could fail to be characterized as "arising out of the lease" and
as "pre-empting" tribal authority. An interesting corollary to this
question developed in Washington, a state claiming civil and criminal
jurisdiction over Indians under Public Law 280.29 There the Washington Supreme Court proscribed enforcement of a county zoning
ordinance with respect to a non-Indian lessee operating a refuse
dump on Indian lands, holding that enforcement would constitute an
unlawful "encumbrance" upon the land and a restriction upon the
use to which the lessor might put it." 0 In any event, burdened by
Article XXI of its constitution and lacking Title IV jurisdiction, it is
far from certain that New Mexico is legally empowered to administer
state law over the lessee, particularly when that law must limit the
use of reserved lands or interfere in some degree with tribal administration of the lease.
THE VALIDITY AND NECESSITY OF THE STIPULATION AS AN
INSTRUMENT ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION
Making the questionable assumption that New Mexico is competent to assume the jurisdiction purportedly established in the
stipulation, the question remains whether the stipulation itself is a
valid instrument, performing any function in resolving jurisdictional
disputes. The overriding factor here is the lack of participation in the
stipulation by either the Pueblo de Cochiti or the Department of
Interior. If it were ultimately resolved that New Mexico has the
jurisdiction asserted in the stipulation without the consent of either
the Pueblo or the lessee, then the stipulation itself would be immaterial for it conveys nothing which the State would not already
have. Thus the more precise question is whether New Mexico may
properly assert jurisdiction based on the stipulation.
Although principles of international law are obviously not con29. Although Washington is not included among the states listed in the statute, the State
Supreme Court was of the opinion that it had nevertheless assumed jurisdiction by fulfilling
the requirements of Public Law 280 § 6 through action by its state legislature. Snohomish
County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 668, 425 P.2d 22, 25 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1016 (1967).
30. Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wash. 668, 425 P.2d 22 (1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
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trolling as to the validity of an agreement between a state and a
lessee of pueblo lands, an analogy to some basic concepts may nevertheless prove enlightening. Recognizing first that Great Western
Cities by its acquiescence would bind neither the Pueblo de Cochiti
nor the United States who were not signatories, 3 1 the focus must be
on the State's powers to compel compliance directly from Great
Western and the Town of Cochiti Lake absent the assistance of the
Pueblo government. The Restatement recognizes two types of jurisdiction, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. 3 2 Jurisdiction to prescribe may exist separately, but in no case can a nation
enforce a rule it has prescribed unless it first had jurisdiction to
prescribe the rule.3 ' In general there are two bases for asserting
jurisdiction, territorial and national. 3 4 A nation may prescribe a rule
affecting conduct outside its territory when such conduct has sub3
stantial effect within its territory or involves one of its nationals. s
Absent a specific agreement a nation does not have enforcement
jurisdiction outside its territory. 3 6
Borrowing international legal terminology it might be suggested
that New Mexico has jurisdiction under the stipulation to prescribe
rules of conduct for Great Western Cities. At least Great Western and
the Town of Cochiti Lake appear contractually bound to adhere to
such rules. Tiie question is whether the rules can be enforced when
contrary to the dictates of the Pueblo, or, restated, whether State
regulation to the extent authorized under the stipulation could be
upheld where it impairs the lessee's performance under the lease.
Since the stipulation itself lacks the assent of the Pueblo and is
therefore not binding upon it, the State has acquired no jurisdiction
over the Pueblo or the lease beyond that which it already had. As
discussed above, however, there are substantial grounds for concluding that matters arising from the lease are for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pueblo. What the State has gained from the stipulation
appears to be at best a contractual commitment from the lessee to
comply with certain State regulations where it can do so consistently
31. This was clearly the position of the Department of Interior at the time the case was
dismissed. In a memorandum dated June 23, 1971, from the Acting Associate Solicitor,
Indian Affairs, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (on file at the office of Attorney
Thomas 0. Olson, Albuquerque) it was stated:
The only thing the United States has stipulated to is the dismissal of the action
with prejudice. The provisions of the stipulation signed by Great Western
Cities, Inc., the Town of Cochiti Lake and the State of New Mexico are not
binding on the United States or the Pueblo of Cochiti.
32. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 6 (1965).
33. Id. § 7.
34. Id. § 10.
35. Id. § § 18, 30.
36. Id. § § 20, 24, 25.
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with compliance with provisions of the lease. Barring the prior existence of State jurisdiction over the lease itself or State power to
regulate the use of Pueblo lands (either case would make the stipulation immaterial), where the stipulation would require the lessee to
violate his lease or the mandates of the Indian lessor, it would be an
3
illegal contract, and the regulations consequently unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
As a means of resolving the jurisdictional issues raised by real
estate developments on Indian reservations, there is little to recommend the stipulation. The very real possibility that New Mexico has
exceeded the legal limits of its own authority in agreeing to assume
the prescribed jurisdiction reduces the strength and significance of
the document. Furthermore, even if the State could assume such
powers it is doubtful that they could be conveyed, much less enforced, without the acquiescence of the Pueblo and the United States
Government. One can only conclude that New Mexico has accomplished nothing by the stipulation, that its powers of enforcement
remain as before suit was filed, and that the inevitable confrontation
between Pueblo and State interests has only been postponed. Yet
even with its weaknesses the stipulation has managed to deal with
only the most elementary problems raised by such developments.
The tax question which it scarcely touches holds devastating implica3
tions for the future marketability of Indian lands. 8 Myriad other
problems of government and services are certain to appear as the
proposed city grows.
Numerous attempts have been made to characterize Indian tribes
since Chief Justice Marshall portrayed them as "domestic dependent
But when these characterizations are assembled they
nations." 3
become a collage of contrasting pieces depicting, if anything, only
the confusion of a century and a half of fluctuating Indian policy,
and challenging the most artful intellect to find a consistent whole.
Tribal economic development is now entering a new era. That the
responsibility should fall on the courts to apply this conceptual
melange of law, regulation, and precedent to the solution of the
issues it will raise seems inconceivable. What is indicated, rather, is
the need for re-evaluation and the ultimate determination of an
37. Restatement of Contracts § § 236, 512, 592, 598 (1932).
38. The tax question is currently being litigated. In Agua Caliente Band of Mission
Indians v. County of Riverside, 442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), the Ninth Circuit upheld the
imposition of a possessory interest tax on the lessee of Indian lands where there was no
legislation evidencing a Congressional intent to forbid it. The case is currently before the
Supreme Court on petition for certiorari, docket number 71-183, filed Aug. 6, 1971.
39. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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enduring Indian policy. For two hundred years the exigencies of a
growing nation have dictated the piecemeal sacrifice of Indian rights.
This generation may well have the privilege of making the final
sacrifice, unless, as the Indian moves into the economic maelstrom,
his rights, obligations, and status are clearly defined and protected.4 0
THOMAS W. OLSON

40. A related article offering possible solutions to jurisdictional conflicts appears in this
issue. Note, 2 N.M. L. Rev. 71 (1972).

